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INTRODUCTION 
I am delighted to participate in this symposium on Professor Linda C. 
McClain’s wonderful new book, Who’s the Bigot? Learning from Conflicts over 
Marriage and Civil Rights Law.1 All of the other papers in this symposium focus 
on Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission2 (and thus 
connect with Chapter Eight of her book, on claims of religious exemptions from 
protections of gay and lesbian rights), while my piece will join issue with the 
related Chapter Seven, on bigotry, motives, and morality in the Supreme Court’s 
gay and lesbian rights cases. In this brief Essay, I cannot do justice to McClain’s 
rich, insightful, and illuminating treatment of bigotry. But I can offer some 
thoughts on the unnecessary and unfortunate focus on “bigotry” in analyzing 
opposition to gay and lesbian rights that are deeply informed by and congruent 
with those in her book. 
Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court’s analysis of the constitutional 
flaws in laws denying liberty or equality to gays and lesbians has undergone a 
significant shift—from forbidding illegitimate emotions to rejecting inadequate 
reasons. I sketch that shift by examining three leading decisions. In Romer v. 
Evans,3 the Court held that a state constitutional amendment—barring protection 
of gays and lesbians from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation—
reflected unconstitutional “animus” against and “a bare . . . desire to harm [them 
as] a politically unpopular group.”4 In Lawrence v. Texas,5 by contrast, the Court 
concluded that laws banning intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons 
unconstitutionally “demean[ed] the lives” of gays and lesbians.6 I will leave 
United States v. Windsor7 out of the analysis, viewing it as a ladder8 from Romer 
and Lawrence to Obergefell v. Hodges.9 Finally, in Obergefell, the Court ruled 
that laws not extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples 
unconstitutionally denied equal dignity and respect to gays and lesbians and 
failed to afford them and their children the status and benefits of equal 
citizenship.10 
 
1 See generally LINDA C. MCCLAIN, WHO’S THE BIGOT? LEARNING FROM CONFLICTS OVER 
MARRIAGE AND CIVIL RIGHTS LAW (forthcoming 2020) (on file with the Boston University 
Law Review). Page references to Who’s the Bigot? in this Essay refer to the penultimate 
version of  the book (indicated as “manuscript”). 
2 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). 
3 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
4 Id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973)). 
5 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
6 Id. at 575. 
7 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
8 See id. at 769-70, 772-75 (applying both animus and social meaning of denial 
frameworks). 
9 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
10 Id. at 2604, 2608. 
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Thus, in Romer, emotions animating the denials of gay and lesbian rights 
evidently played a central role, whereas in Lawrence and Obergefell, it was the 
social meaning of the denials that was crucial. I shall argue that the focus in 
Romer on emotions—”animus” and the “bare desire to harm,” which Justice 
Scalia’s dissent equated with “racial or religious bias” or “bigotry”11—is 
unnecessary and unfortunate.12 I shall also contend that the shift in Lawrence 
and Obergefell—to concluding that laws denying rights to gays and lesbians 
demean their existence and deny them the status and benefits of equal 
citizenship—puts gay and lesbian rights on firmer ground and better deflects 
Justice Scalia’s and other dissenters’ allegations that the Court is charging 
opponents of gay and lesbian rights with bigotry.13 
Some arguments against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation have 
drawn analogies to discrimination on the basis of race.14 These arguments 
typically presuppose that the wrong in racial discrimination is—in the famous 
formulation of United States v. Carolene Products Co.15—”prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities” or bigotry and irrational hatred.16 These sound 
like strong emotions. When people make arguments for gay and lesbian rights 
using such formulations—along with their “lite” cousins “animus” and the 
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”17—they provoke strong 
reactions. Indeed, some conservative justices have objected that these 
formulations disparage the character of the people defending the laws 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation when in fact their opposition to 
gay and lesbian rights is rooted in sincerely and conscientiously held religious 
convictions. For example, in dissent in Romer, Justice Scalia took umbrage at 
what he interpreted to be the Court’s charge that people who support preserving 
traditional sexual morality—as against what he would call in Lawrence the 
“homosexual agenda”18—are the moral equivalent of racial and religious 
bigots.19 And in dissent in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts objected that the 
majority was tarring religious opponents of same-sex marriage with the brush of 
bigotry.20 
In the best justifications for rights of gays and lesbians, including the rights 
to intimate association and to marry, such emotions need not play a central role. 
Analysis of prejudice, bigotry, and irrational hatred—and their “lite” cousins 
 
11 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636, 652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
12 See discussion infra Part I. 
13 See discussion infra Parts II-III. 
14 See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 77). 
15 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
16 Id. at 152-53 n.4. 
17 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
18 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
19 Romer, 517 U.S. at 636, 652 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
20 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2626 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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“animus” and the “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”21—is 
unnecessary to justify gay and lesbian rights. In fact, such analysis has proven 
to be an unfortunate distraction—to be sure, an understandable one but a 
distraction nonetheless. The better ground for justifying gay and lesbian rights 
stresses that laws failing to afford such rights deny them equal dignity and 
respect, demean their existence, and deprive them of the status and benefits of 
equal citizenship without adequate reasons. Let us begin at the beginning, with 
Romer, and then trace the shift in the ground for rights through Lawrence and 
Obergefell. 
I. ROMER: “ANIMUS” AGAINST AND A “BARE DESIRE TO HARM A 
POLITICALLY UNPOPULAR GROUP” DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 
TO GAYS AND LESBIANS 
Romer involved a challenge, under the Equal Protection Clause, to a Colorado 
state constitutional amendment forbidding the protection of gays and lesbians 
from discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.22 The state had adopted 
this amendment after several progressive cities had passed local ordinances 
protecting them from such discrimination.23 
In Romer, decided in 1996, the Court does not even consider certain familiar 
equal protection arguments that were available at the time. First, it does not 
consider whether discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, like that on 
the basis of race, embodies a “suspect classification” that would trigger “strict 
scrutiny.”24 Under this most stringent form of review, courts would require that 
to be valid, laws employing classifications on the basis of sexual orientation 
must promote a “compelling governmental interest” and must be “narrowly 
tailored” to furthering that interest.25 Relatedly, the Court does not inquire 
whether the legal measure being challenged, like measures discriminating on the 
basis of race, reflects “prejudice” against a “discrete and insular minority.”26 
Under conventional analysis, such prejudice reflects bigotry or irrational 
hostility toward such minorities. 
Second, the Court does not address whether discrimination on the basis of 
sexual orientation is impermissible discrimination on the basis of gender that 
would invoke “intermediate scrutiny.”27 Under this relatively stringent form of 
review, courts would require that laws, to be upheld, must promote an 
“important governmental objective” and must be “substantially related” to 
 
21 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
22 Id. at 623. 
23 Id. 
24 JAMES E. FLEMING ET AL., GAY RIGHTS AND THE CONSTITUTION 114 (2016). 
25 Id. (discussing applicability of strict scrutiny to laws discriminating against gays and 
lesbians). 
26 United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
27 FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 114. 
  
2019] ANIMUS, BARE DESIRE TO HARM, AND BIGOTRY 2675 
 
furthering that objective.28 On this view, the constitutional flaw in laws 
discriminating against gays and lesbians is that they aim to enforce traditional 
gender roles upon gays and lesbians and therefore represent a form of 
discrimination on the basis of gender. 
Why did Justice Kennedy’s opinion of the Court in Romer not take either of 
these two available doctrinal routes? My view is that Justice Kennedy was not 
about to take the first route: he wanted not only to avoid taking the big and 
controversial step to holding that sexual orientation is a “suspect classification” 
analogous to race, but also to avoid implying that opposition to gay and lesbian 
rights is analogous to prejudice or bigotry against “discrete and insular 
minorities” like racial minorities.29 Justice Kennedy presumably also was not 
prepared to take the second route: not only because he did not wish to take the 
big and controversial step to holding that sexual orientation discrimination is a 
somewhat suspicious classification on the basis of gender, but also because he 
wanted to avoid resting the holding upon a complex and controversial normative 
theory about sexual orientation discrimination and the enforcement of gender 
roles not likely to have been acceptable (or even comprehensible) to many 
people in 1996. 
These were the two main doctrinal roads to protecting gay and lesbian rights 
not taken in Romer. Were there any other roads available at the time? There was 
an emerging line of cases dealing with classifications that were not quite 
“suspect classifications” but toward which the Court was somewhat suspicious 
out of concern that majorities might be treating disfavored minorities unequally 
out of lack of concern for, fear of, or hostility toward them.30 Department of 
Agriculture v. Moreno31 involved denying food stamps to needy individuals who 
were living together but were “unrelated persons.”32 The law, the Court held, 
was intended to prevent “hippies” and “hippie communes” from participating in 
the food stamp program.33 The Court further held that a “bare congressional 
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate 
governmental interest.”34 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,35 a 
prominent case building upon Moreno in this line of decisions leading up to 
Romer, involved discrimination against developmentally disabled persons.36 
The Court stated that “mere negative attitudes” of the majority of property 
owners based on prejudice against developmentally disabled persons was not an 
 
28 E.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199 (1976). 
29 Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152-53 n.4. 
30 FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 114-15 (describing shift from deferential approach to 
rational basis scrutiny with “bite” in analyzing justifications for nonsuspect classifications). 
31 413 U.S. 528 (1973). 
32 Id. at 531-32. 
33 Id. at 534. 
34 Id. 
35 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
36 Id. at 435-37. 
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adequate reason to deny a permit to establish a home for such persons in a 
residential neighborhood.37 McClain richly shows how the challengers of the 
state constitutional amendment in Romer drew upon this line of precedents in 
formulating their arguments.38  
In Romer’s majority opinion, Justice Kennedy argued that the state 
constitutional amendment being challenged, which discriminated on the basis of 
sexual orientation, likewise reflected illegitimate “animus” and “bare . . . desire 
to harm.”39 Thus, in the first case to protect gay and lesbian rights in U.S. 
constitutional law, Justice Kennedy invoked cases involving discrimination, not 
on the basis of race or gender—which might have seemed analogous to sexual 
orientation—but against needy “hippies” and developmentally disabled persons. 
This might not seem an auspicious beginning for gay and lesbian rights! Taking 
this route, the Court did not have to reach the controversial decision that sexual 
orientation is like race or gender and warrants “strict scrutiny” or “intermediate 
scrutiny.” On the other hand, the Court did not simply defer to and uphold the 
legislation if one might reasonably conclude that the legislation was rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental objective (the least stringent form of 
judicial review in U.S. constitutional law). Instead, the Court applied what has 
come to be known as “rational basis scrutiny” with “bite.”40 That is, the Court 
put some teeth into the requirement that a law be rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental objective—be justified by an adequate reason—and it found the 
state constitutional amendment unconstitutional under that standard.41 
The good news is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer took a doctrinal 
route that he quite reasonably might have thought would avoid the controversial 
insinuation that opposition to gay and lesbian rights was as objectionable as 
racial bigotry. Let us pause to observe, however, that “animus” may amount to 
“prejudice” “lite” and that “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group” sounds like “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” “lite.”42 
Furthermore, “rational basis scrutiny” with “bite” may turn out to be a “lite” 
version of relatively stringent “intermediate scrutiny.”43 
The bad news is that Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Romer nevertheless 
prompted Justice Scalia to object in dissent that the Court was “equating the 
 
37 Id. at 448. 
38 See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 163-67). 
39 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 
413 U.S. at 534). 
40 See FLEMING ET AL., supra note 24, at 115 (comparing rational basis scrutiny with “bite” 
to “toothless” review of rational basis scrutiny). 
41 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 635. 
42 Compare id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534), with 
United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
43 See JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 169 (2013). 
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moral disapproval of homosexual conduct with racial and religious bigotry.”44 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion, by giving a central role to “animus” and a 
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”45—instead of avoiding 
the charge that he is implying that opponents of gay and lesbian rights are 
bigots—practically invites that charge. We should apply a principle of 
interpretive charity to Justice Kennedy’s opinion: he did the best he could with 
the doctrinal tools available at the time. Like a good common law constitutional 
interpreter, he reached for the precedents available—Cleburne and Moreno—
and, since they used the terms “animus” against and a “bare . . . desire to harm 
a politically unpopular group,” he applied that formulation to the denial of rights 
to gays and lesbians.46 Understandably, Justice Kennedy may have thought that 
taking this route would avoid analogies to prejudice against racial minorities and 
thus to bigotry. But to no avail. Justice Scalia wailed that Justice Kennedy was 
charging opponents of gay and lesbian rights with bigotry anyway! 
Was there an alternative route that Justice Kennedy could have taken in 
Romer that might have avoided holding that “animus” against and a 
“bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group” were the constitutional 
flaws?47 Was there any other ground for the decision that might have averted 
Justice Scalia’s accusation that the majority was tarring the opponents of gay 
and lesbian rights with the brush of bigotry? In fact, there was another route—
which provides a bridge to Lawrence, the next decision protecting gay and 
lesbian rights—and Justice Kennedy arguably took it as well in Romer. He 
quoted Justice Harlan’s famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson48 that the 
Constitution “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”49 This 
principle—the core of an anti-class or anti-caste principle—forbids government 
to “deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws” by branding them as pariahs, 
outlaws, or outcasts.50 The state constitutional amendment had done precisely 
that to gays and lesbians.51 It was a “status-based . . . classification of persons” 
that was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose.52 
Under this principle, the constitutional flaw in the state amendment was that 
it denied the status of equal citizenship, including the benefits and protections 
afforded to other citizens, to a group of persons who were worthy of those 
benefits and protections. Taking this route, what matters is not the illegitimate 
 
44 Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
45 See id. at 632, 634 (majority opinion) (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. 
at 534). 
46 See id. (applying principles from Cleburne and Moreno). 
47 Id. 
48 163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
49 Romer, 517 U.S. at 623 (quoting Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting)). 
50 Id. at 635. 
51 See id. (“We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals . . . to make them 
unequal to everyone else.”). 
52 Id. 
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emotions animating the denial of equal citizenship—”animus” against and “a 
bare . . . desire to harm [them as] a politically unpopular group”53—but the 
social meaning of the denial—that gays and lesbians are pariahs, outlaws, or 
outcasts. And what undergirds the holding that the state amendment is 
unconstitutional is the normative judgment to the contrary that gays and lesbians 
are worthy of the status, benefits, and protections of equal citizenship. Thus, 
normative judgments that there are no adequate reasons for denying these 
protections to gays and lesbians are an alternative—and superior—basis for 
protecting gay and lesbian rights. 
II. LAWRENCE: DEMEANING THE EXISTENCE OF GAYS AND LESBIANS 
IS AN INADEQUATE REASON FOR DENYING THEM BASIC LIBERTIES 
In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that laws criminalizing intimate sexual 
conduct between same-sex persons denied basic liberty in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.54 The Court dropped the inquiry 
into “animus” and “a bare . . . desire to harm,”55 replacing it with an inquiry into 
the social meaning of a practice—laws that deny the right of intimate association 
to gays and lesbians “demean their existence” and are not rationally related to a 
legitimate governmental objective.56 In previous decisions, the Court had 
recognized a right to autonomy and intimate association for straights.57 
According to Justice Kennedy, same-sex intimate association is analogous to 
opposite-sex intimate association.58 And gays and lesbians engage in intimate 
association for the same purposes and to pursue the same moral goods as 
straights.59 Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that gays and lesbians are entitled 
to “respect for their private lives.”60 Accordingly, he determined that the State 
may not “demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private 
sexual conduct a crime.”61 Justice Kennedy implicitly judged gays’ and lesbians’ 
sexual intimacy and way of life to be as morally worthy and entitled to respect 
as that of straights.62 This normative judgment underpins the conclusion that 
laws prohibiting sexual intimacy between same-sex persons demean the 
existence of gays and lesbians. At the time, Justice Kennedy wrote Lawrence as 
 
53 Id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973)). 
54 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003). 
55 Romer, 517 U.S. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534). 
56 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
57 See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967). 
58 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574 (“Persons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy 
for [intimate and personal choices], just as heterosexual persons do.”). 
59 See FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 13 (identifying moral goods of intimate 
association to include commitment, nurture, and intimacy). 
60 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. 
61 Id. 
62 See id. 
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a due process holding rather than an equal protection holding (although there 
were unmistakable intimations of a concern for equality in his due process 
arguments).63 In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy looked back and stated that 
Lawrence intertwined due process and equal protection.64 
Thus, the Court held that gays and lesbians, far from being pariahs, outlaws, 
or outcasts, were entitled to equal dignity and respect. This significant shift in 
the inquiry—from whether a law (1) embodies animus against gays and lesbians 
and a bare desire to harm them to whether it (2) demeans their existence—
represents a transition from a focus on illegitimate emotions to an emphasis on 
the social meaning of the law. The latter provides a better grounding for gay and 
lesbian rights. To recapitulate Lawrence’s better justification: laws criminalizing 
intimate sexual conduct between same-sex persons demean the existence of gays 
and lesbians, denying them basic liberties extended to other persons without any 
adequate justification for doing so. Affording these liberties is necessary to 
secure the status and benefits of equal citizenship. These formulations were 
prefigured in Romer’s alternative route, forbidding laws treating certain classes 
of persons as pariahs or strangers to the law.65 
With this better justification on hand, we can see that Justice Scalia’s 
objections that the majority tarred the opponents of same-sex intimate 
association with the brush of bigotry are overwrought and inapt. Holding that 
the laws forbidding same-sex couples from engaging in intimate sexual conduct 
deny such couples equal dignity and respect in no way impugns the motivations 
or character of opponents. It does not charge opponents with “animus” against 
or a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group.”66 It simply 
recognizes that the social meaning of such laws—even if based on sincerely and 
conscientiously held religious convictions—is to deny equal dignity and respect 
to gays and lesbians. The fact that opponents act out of sincerely and 
conscientiously held religious views is not an adequate reason to deny gays and 
lesbians the basic liberties and status and benefits of equal citizenship already 
afforded to straights. The recognition of this fact became central in Obergefell. 
 
63 Id. at 575, 578 (recognizing that equality of treatment and due process are “linked in 
important respects” but basing holding on due process grounds); see also FLEMING & 
MCCLAIN, supra note 43, at 265-67 (exploring development of due process doctrine in 
Lawrence). 
64 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (“In Lawrence the Court 
acknowledged the interlocking nature of [due process and equal protection] in the context of 
the legal treatment of gays and lesbians.”). 
65 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1995) (“Amendment 2 classifies 
homosexuals . . . to make them unequal to everyone else. . . . A State cannot so deem a class 
of persons a stranger to its laws.”). 
66 See id. at 632, 634 (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 
528, 534 (1973)). 
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III. OBERGEFELL: THE STATE MAY NOT DENY EQUAL DIGNITY OR THE 
STATUS AND BENEFITS OF EQUAL CITIZENSHIP TO GAYS AND LESBIANS 
In Obergefell, ruling that the fundamental right to marry extends to same-sex 
couples, Justice Kennedy writes the majority opinion in the same vein as in 
Lawrence rather than in that of Romer. Obergefell completes Lawrence’s shift 
away from illegitimate emotions with a more fully articulated justification for 
why laws denying basic liberties to gays and lesbians lack any adequate 
justification. Here I briefly encapsulate the reasoning of Obergefell. 
Gays and lesbians are entitled to the rights to autonomy, to intimate 
association, and to marry, all of which are already protected for straights. The 
state may not demean the existence of their morally legitimate way of life by 
denying them these rights. They are entitled to equal dignity and respect. The 
state has created an important institution—civil marriage—to promote certain 
noble purposes and moral goods. In Obergefell, Justice Kennedy quotes the 
stirring language from Griswold v. Connecticut67 about the noble purposes of 
marriage: promoting intimacy, harmony, and loyalty within a worthy 
relationship.68 He also quotes the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s 
formulation concerning moral goods in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health69: because marriage “fulfills yearnings for security, safe haven, and 
connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is an esteemed 
institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is among life’s 
momentous acts of self-definition.”70 The Goodridge court also mentions the 
moral goods of commitment, “mutuality, companionship, intimacy, fidelity, and 
family.”71 Same-sex couples are similarly situated to opposite-sex couples with 
respect to the pursuit of such moral goods and the need for the benefits of 
marriage. There is no adequate reason for denying them this right and these 
benefits. Not extending the fundamental right to marry to same-sex couples 
demeans their existence and humiliates them and their children, denying them 
the status and benefits of equal citizenship.72 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell was based primarily on the 
ground that the law denied the fundamental right to marry in violation of the 
Due Process Clause rather than on the ground that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause. Again, Justice Kennedy may have primarily grounded the 
decision on the Due Process Clause instead of the Equal Protection Clause to 
avoid the need to draw analogies between discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation and discrimination on the basis of race. He presumably does so to 
avoid implying that opponents of gay and lesbian rights are analogous to racial 
or religious bigots. Nonetheless, Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and 
 
67 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
68 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599-600 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486). 
69 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
70 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (quoting Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955). 
71 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 954. 
72 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604, 2608. 
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Alito in their dissents in Obergefell contended that the majority opinion had 
portrayed those who did not share its understanding of marriage as bigoted.73 
For example, Justice Alito warned that the majority’s decision would be “used 
to vilify Americans who are unwilling to assent to the new orthodoxy,” and that, 
while “those who cling to old beliefs will be able to whisper their thoughts in 
the recesses of their homes, . . . if they repeat those views in public, they will 
risk being labeled as bigots and treated as such by governments, employers, and 
schools.”74 
As McClain clear-headedly demonstrates, these charges ignore what Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in Obergefell says and does.75 In fact, Justice Kennedy 
nowhere refers to those who oppose allowing same-sex couples to marry as 
bigots; to the contrary, he stresses that he does not doubt the sincerity of 
opponents of same-sex marriage. Moreover, he emphasizes that he is not 
disparaging their conscientious religious convictions: “Many who deem same-
sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable 
religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are 
disparaged here.”76 He also states: “[R]eligions, and those who adhere to 
religious doctrines, may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction 
that, by divine precepts, same-sex marriage should not be condoned.”77 But he 
explains that “when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted into law 
and public policy, the necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the 
State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own 
liberty is then denied.”78 
This passage reflects important constitutional limits upon the legal 
enforcement of morality in a pluralistic constitutional democracy: however 
sincere their beliefs, citizens may not use the vehicle of the law to exclude others 
from basic civil institutions. Saying that a law which is sincerely defended by 
people of conscience denies gays and lesbians equal dignity—by denying them 
the status and benefits of equal citizenship where a basic civil institution like 
marriage is concerned—is hardly to tar those people with the brush of bigotry. 
In any case, nothing in Justice Kennedy’s opinion precludes states from enacting 
measures or using existing laws to protect religious liberty, provided they do not 
 
73 See id. at 2626 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of 
today’s decision is the extent to which the majority feels compelled to sully those on the other 
side of the debate.”); id. at 2630 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing majority opinion for 
implying that limiting marriage to one man and one woman “cannot possibly be supported by 
anything other than ignorance or bigotry”); id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In the course 
of its opinion, the majority compares traditional marriage laws to laws that denied equal 
treatment for African-Americans and women. The implications of this analogy will be 
exploited by those who are determined to stamp out every vestige of dissent.”). 
74 Id. at 2642-43 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
75 See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 177-80). 
76 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2602. 
77 Id. at 2607. 
78 Id. at 2602. 
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run afoul of the Court’s holding that same-sex couples must be allowed to 
exercise the fundamental right to marry in all states and that states must allow 
them to marry on the same terms and conditions as opposite-sex couples. 
McClain’s analysis in Chapter Seven of Who’s the Bigot? more fully elaborates 
all of these points than I have in this brief Essay.79 
To recapitulate: What are the benefits of Lawrence and Obergefell—
recognizing that denials of equal respect and dignity along with the status and 
benefits of equal citizenship to gays and lesbians are not justified by adequate 
reasons—over Romer—forbidding illegitimate emotions such as “animus” and 
a “bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group”?80 First, Lawrence and 
Obergefell avoid the insinuation that citizens (and justices) who oppose gay and 
lesbian rights are bigots. To be sure, the dissenters in these cases nonetheless 
charge the majority with branding opponents as bigots. This objection was 
strained in Romer, though understandable given the majority’s invocation of 
“animus” and “bare desire to harm.” The objection is completely off the mark in 
Obergefell given the shift from forbidding illegitimate emotions to securing 
equal dignity and the status and benefits of equal citizenship. 
Second, Lawrence and Obergefell focus on the social meaning of a state of 
affairs in the world for those discriminated against—that laws demean the 
existence of and deny the status and benefits of equal citizenship to gays and 
lesbians—not a state of emotions in the minds of opponents of those rights. 
Justice Scalia, in dissent in Romer, contended that the majority had mistaken a 
“Kulturkampf,” or culture war, for a “fit of spite.”81 Lawrence and Obergefell 
set limits on the “culture war” itself: majorities may not deny basic liberties and 
the status and benefits of equal citizenship for gays and lesbians. To recall 
Romer, majorities may not create inferior classes and brand them as pariahs, 
outlaws, or outcasts.82 As Obergefell put it, “[o]utlaw to outcast may be a step 
forward, but it does not achieve the full promise of liberty” and secure the status 
of equal citizenship.83 
Finally, grounding gay and lesbian rights as Lawrence and Obergefell do 
promises to move beyond settling for “grudging” toleration for gays and 
lesbians, and toward aspiring to acceptance and respect for them—a more stable 
and worthy basis for justifying their rights as equal citizens. All in all, the 
Lawrence and Obergefell approach better captures the stakes in the movement 
for gay and lesbian rights—the aim is not to block illegitimate emotions but to 
secure fundamental rights, equal dignity and respect, and the status and benefits 
of equal citizenship for all. 
 
79 See MCCLAIN, supra note 1 (manuscript at 177-80). 
80 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 634 (1996) (omission in original) (quoting Dep’t 
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)). 
81 Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
82 See discussion supra Part I. 
83 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015). 
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CONCLUSION 
The bottom line is that, no matter what arguments Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinions made for gay and lesbian rights, the dissenting justices cried that those 
opinions were tarring religious opponents of such rights with the brush of 
bigotry. This suggests that crying bigotry is a rhetorical strategy for mobilization 
in the culture war rather than a fair engagement with the arguments in the 
majority opinions. Thanks to McClain’s rich and subtle analysis of bigotry, 
motives, and morality in the Supreme Court’s gay and lesbian rights cases, we 
can see this clearly. 
